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THE EVOLUTION OF THE POLICE OFFICER'S
RIGHT To ARREST WITHOUT A WARRANT
IN COLORADO

T

HE history of Colorado law concerning the rights and liabilities
of an officer in making an arrest without a warrant can best be
described in one word - bewildering. This state of affairs has been
brought about by at least three factors:
1. Reliance upon ill-defined and partially out-moded common
law with a paucity of interpretative cases;
2. Attempts to mend the common law with a statutory patchwork that is less than complete;
3. Unexplained legislative adoption of an Illinois statute' without mentioning, in the Colorado statute's legislative history,
whether the Illinois interpretative case law was also adopted.2
This omission may have significant ramifications.
It is the purpose of this Note to show the past and present status
of the law and the pitfalls to be overcome in the further development
of the police officer's right to arrest without a warrant.
The problem of determining what constitutes an arrest is outside
the scope of this discussion and therefore it shall be assumed that an
arrest has actually been made.
I.

THE 19TH CENTURY EVOLUTION OF ARREST WITHOUT
A WARRANT IN COLORADO

At the outset of its statehood, Colorado officially adopted the
English Common Law:'
The common law of England, so far as the same is applicable
and of a general nature, and all acts and statutes of the British parliament, made in aid of or to supply the defects of the common law
prior to the fourth year of James the First [1607] . . . shall be4
considered as of full force until repealed by legislative authority.
Therefore, any omission in the area of Colorado arrest law may be
supplied by the common law. "May" is appropriate because, as the
cases construing the above statute indicate,5 it is not always easy to
ICompare

COLO. REv. STAT. § 39-2-20 (1963), with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 342

(1874).
2 COLO. SENATE LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL 1078, S. Bill No. 251 (1955).

3 COLO. REv. STAT. Ch. 16, § 1 (1868).
4
COLO. REV. STAT. § 135-1-1 (1963).
5 See the cases annotated under COLO. REV. STAT. § 135-1-1 (1963).
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determine when the common law is "applicable and of a general
nature."
Before going on to specific Colorado statutory and case law it
will be useful to review the basic rudiments of the common law regarding a policeman's right to arrest without a warrant. No attempt
will be made to discuss the technical and complicated distinctions of
the common law,' but rather the basic majority rules will be skimmed:
1. An officer could arrest for a felony or a breach of the peace
committed in his presence, or to prevent the immediate commission of such a crime.'
2. Regarding out-of-presence crimes, an officer could arrest
only for a felony and then only when he had reasonable
grounds for believing that a felony had been committed and
that the person arrested was guilty of the felony.8 If the officer were mistaken as to the commission of the crime or as
to the person arrested, he would still be exempt from liability
if his actions were based on "reasonable cause."
3. For a misdemeanor not amounting to a breach of the peace,
the majority common law rule was that an officer could not
arrest without a warrant regardless of whether it was perpetrated in or out of his presence.9
Turning to specific statutory law, Colorado first delineated an
officer's responsibility in this area by adopting an arrest-without-awarrant statute in 1861.o This statute, as it was originally enacted,
still stands today. It reads:
When any felonious offense shall be committed, public notice
thereof shall be immediately given in all public places near where
the same was committed, and fresh pursuit shall forthwith be made
after every person guilty thereof by sheriffs, coroners, constables,
and all other persons who shall be by any of them commanded or

summoned for that purpose."'

The statute is as significant for what it does not say as for what
it does say. For example, the specific reference to "felonious," by
implication, excludes misdemeanors from its scope. Furthermore, the
statute makes it the officer's duty to engage in fresh pursuit. Nothing is said about the common law right of an officer to arrest on
"reasonable grounds" for a long-past felony not committed in his
presence; nor is anything specifically mentioned concerning breaches
of the peace.
6 PROSSER, TORTS §
"Id. at 135.

26, at 134 (3d ed. 1964).

8 ibid.
9Id. at 136.
10 Colo. Sess. Laws 1861, § 157, at 326.

11COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-2-2 (1963).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL, 43

These unanswered questions were at least partially settled by
the 1891 case of Union Depot & R.R. v. Smith.'2 The defendant arrested the plaintiff for violating a city ordinance in the defendant's
presence. The defendant, claiming to be a duly appointed police officer, contended that he had the right without a warrant to arrest a
person committing a misdemeanor in his presence. The court, after
concluding that the defendant was not a police officer, said:
It is otherwise with an officer. He may arrest when he has
reasonable grounds to suspect that a felony has been committed, and
justify by proof of a ground which the law deems reasonable....

This rule has never been extended so as to protect the officer in case
of an arrest for misdemeanor .... Where the rights of a police officer to arrest for a misdemeanor have been conceded, it has not
been held to include an authority broad enough to embrace arrests

for violations of municipal ordinances. To justify the arrest by an
officer for an offense of this description, a statute must be found

clothing the officer with the right, which must be exercised under
the circumstances designated by the enactment .... A statute upon
this subject has been enacted in this state, and doubtless a policeman

would be authorized to make an arrest for a violation of a municipal ordinance where the offense was committed in his presence. 3
The 1877 statute referred to in the Union Depot case stated, "The
duty of the chief and other officers of the police ... shall be, to apprehend any and all persons in the act of committing any offense
against the laws of the state or ordinance of the city .
"..""
This
statute plus the Union Depot interpretation extended the officer's
common law right by allowing him to arrest for a misdemeanor, or
breach of a city ordinance committed in his presence.
Five years later in Newman v. People," the court reinforced
these rights by saying:
Indeed were this statute not in existence, it would be, as we have
already intimated, the official duty of the sheriff, where he knows
or sees that a criminal offense is being committed, without warrant, and upon view, to arrest the offender and to seize and take

into custody the subject of the crime. .....1
These changes reflect a growing awareness of the impracticality
of distinguishing between a felony and a misdemeanor for purposes
of arresting without a warrant. 7 This impracticality is illustrated by
Colorado's shoplifting statute. 8 Shoplifting articles valued at less
than one hundred dollars is a misdemeanor on the first or second offense while shoplifting articles worth more than that amount is a fel'1 Union Depot & R.R. v. Smith, 16 Colo. 361, 27 Pac. 329 (1891).
13Id. at 365, 27 Pac. at 331.
14 COLO. GEN. LAWs ch. 100, § 77 (1877).

'5 Newman v. People, 23 Colo. 300, 47 Pac. 278 0896.
16 Id. at 310, 47 Pac. at 282.

op. cit. supra note 6, at 136.
18 CoLo. REv. STAT. § 49-5-29 (1963).

17 PIROSSER,
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ony."9

If it had been illegal to arrest for an "in presence" misdemeanor,
an officer seeing a man grasping a wristwatch and running away from
a shopkeeper would have been faced with a difficult decision. If he
had arrested and the watch had been worth less than one hundred
dollars, he probably would have arrested for a misdemeanor which
was beyond his authority; if the watch had been worth more than
one hundred dollars, the officer would not only have had a right but
a duty to arrest. The avoidance of this type of problem by granting
the officer the right to arrest for an in-presence misdemeanor is a
logical expansion of his common law right, necessary because of the
present-day difficulty in readily determining whether an offense is a
felony or a misdemeanor.
However, at this point in Colorado history, the necessity of distinguishing between a felony and a misdemeanor remained as to outof-presence offenses since neither the statute nor the case law extended to the officer the right to arrest for out-of-presence misdemeanors or violations of city ordinances.
By the turn of the century, the police officer's rights and liabilities regarding arrest, as declared by the common law plus statutory
and case modification, were as follows:
1. Concerning a felony, the same rights existed as at common
law. He could arrest whether the crime was committed
within or without his presence, and he was not liable if his
mistake as to the person or commission of the crime was
"reasonable."
2. Contrary to the majority common law rule, the officer had
the right to arrest for violations of city ordinances and misdemeanors committed in his presence. However, without a
warrant he could not arrest for these same offenses when
they were committed out of his presence.
3. Since the statute enlarging the common law right to arrest
for in-presence crimes said nothing about the corresponding
liabilities ,20 it is not clear whether the officer would be immune from liability for a reasonable mistake as to the person arrested or the commission of the misdemeanor. Since
this immunity from liability did not exist at conmon law
and statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly
construed, 1 it seems likely that the officer mistakenly but
reasonably arresting for a misdemeanor would have been
liable. The practical ramifications of this result are again
19 Ibid.
2

0 COLO. GEN. LAWS ch. 100,

§ 77 (1877).

21 Stowell v. People, 104 Colo. 255, 258, 90 P.2d 520, 521 (1939).
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illustrated by the shoplifting hypothetical. If the officer
had been "reasonably wrong" as to the actual commission
of the crime or the guilt of the person arrested, and the
watch had been worth more than one hundred dollars, he
would not have been liable. If, on the other hand, the
watch had been worth less than one hundred dollars, he
would have been liable unless it were the shoplifter's third
offense.
At the turn of the century, while Colorado had made some
progress toward more realistic and workable laws in the area of
arrest, important problems and questions remained unsolved.
II.

RECENT RAMIFICATIONS

The first significant changes resulted from the enactment of a
1955 statute which reads:
[Aln arrest may be made by an officer or by a private person without warrant, for a criminal offense committed in his presence; and
by an officer, when a criminal offense has in fact been committed,
and he has reasonable grounds for believing that the person to be
arrested has committed it.22 (Emphasis added.)
Before analyzing the effect of this statute, one source of justifiable confusion must be removed. The 1955 case of Johnson v.
Enlow,' although mentioned in the annotation following this statute,"4 is merely a restatement of the law existing prior to its enactment; 5 it is not an interpretation of the statute.
The use of the word "criminal" rather than "felonious" in the
statute is very significant because "criminal offense," as defined by
Colorado case law, includes misdemeanors26 and violations of city
ordinances 7 as well as felonies. Thus the statute established the
right of an officer to arrest for a misdemeanor or violation of a city
ordinance committed without as well as within his presence. No
longer is the officer taking the risk of arresting a person for an
offense committed out of his presence which later turns out to be
a misdemeanor. Furthermore, regardless of the type of offense
committed, the officer is now relieved from liability for mistakenly
arresting the wrong person if he had reasonable cause for believing
the person was the guilty party, provided the offense was in fact
2 COLO. REv. STAT. § 39-2-20 (1963).
3 Johnson v. Enlow, 132 Colo. 101, 286 P.2d 630 (1955).

2

Ibid.
The cause of action in the Johnson case arose in 1952 while the statute wasn't enacted
until 1955. In addition, neither the attorneys' briefs nor the supreme court's decision
mentioned the statute.
26 Hoffman v. People, 72 Colo. 552, 558, 212 Pac. 848, 851 (1923).
24

25

2

Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958).
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committed. This holds true whether the misdemeanor was committed within or without the officer's presence. In these areas the
statute makes needed progress in enlarging the officer's right to
arrest.
In spite of this progress, the statute raises vitally important
questions. One problem, beyond the scope of this paper, results
from the fact that the ordinary citizen's right to arrest without a
warrant has been radically increased.28 The plain words of the
statute indicate that a citizen may arrest for any "in-presence" criminal offense.'
Remembering that "criminal offense" encompasses felony, misdemeanor and a violation of a city ordinance, the plain words of
the statute confer the right on one citizen to arrest another, when
an offense has been committed in his presence, for making too much
noise and thus disturbing the peace, for failing to license a dog or
for over-parking!
A second problem, and one of great consequence to the police
officer, is the fact that the plain words of the statute require that
the offense must in fact have been committed in order to justify the
arrest, thereby invalidating the old common law rule that an officer
need have only reasonable grounds for believing that a felony had
been committed." Not only is this change clearly contrary to the
great weight of American authority,3' but it also places an enormous
and unrealistic burden on the arresting officer, as illustrated by the
following hypothetical: An officer happens into a dark alley and
finds a known criminal going through the pockets of an unconscious
well-dressed man. The criminal is caught and arrested. Several
days later it is learned that the man suffered a heart attack and
injured himself in the fall. The man testifies that he asked the
criminal to get his digitalis pills from his pocket. It is clear that
there was reasonable cause to believe an offense had been or was
being committed; yet, because no offense was in fact committed,
the officer is subject to civil liability for false arrest.
A third problem, that of statutory construction, is raised in
determining the ramifications of the "in fact" language of the
statute. It is possible that the "in fact" words of the statute can be
circumvented, as has been suggested," by holding that the legislature intended that an officer's common law immunities would sur2 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 6, at 135.
29
CoLo. REV. STAT. § 39-2-20 (1963).
30 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 6, at 135.
31 5 AM. JUR. 2d Arrest § 25 (1962).

32 Scott, Criminal Law and Procedure, Highlights of the 1955 Legislative Session, 28
RocKY MT. L. REv. 69'(1956).
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vive and that the statute would merely extend additional rights. On
the other hand, the statute's unequivocal "in fact" language and
the absence of any language preserving the officer's immunities33
seem to counterbalance the strict construction accorded to statutes
in derogation of the common law.
Ultimately, the question of statutory construction must be resolved by determining the legislative intent. In determining this
intent, the legislative history of the statute is vitally important.
Colorado Revised Statutes, section 39-2-20 (1963) is an adoption
of an 1874 Illinois statute. 4 When Colorado adopts the statute of
a sister state, a presumption arises that it also adopts the sister
state's interpretative case law existing at the time of the adoption."
This may be a particularly strong presumption when an Illinois
statute is adopted." If this presumption holds, the Illinois case law
manifests the Colorado legislative intent. Unfortunately, because
Colorado keeps only minimal records of the legislative history leading to the enactment of its statutes, there is no competent evidence
supporting or rebutting this presumption. 7
In 1964 the latter two problems were squarely met by the defendant's brief in the Colorado case of Boyer v. Elkins. 8 The Boyer
brothers, defendants in a civil suit, were being sued for assault and
battery of two police officers who had attempted to arrest them for
misdemeanors and city ordinance violations committed out of the
officers' presence. The Boyers' counsel did not dispute the officers' right to arrest for violation of a city ordinance or misdemeanor
that was in fact committed out of their presence. Instead, they
argued that the arrest was illegal because they had not committed
any offense before the attempted arrest, and that the statute clearly
states the arrest is only legal if a "criminal offense" has in fact been
committed. Therefore, because the arrest was illegal, they claimed
33
34

COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-2-20 (1963).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 342 (1874).

Hoen v. District Court, 412 P.2d 428, 430 (Colo. 1966); Warner v. People, 71 Colo.
559, 208 Pac. 459 (1922) ; Russell v. Jordan, 58 Colo. 445, 447, 147 Pac. 693, 694
(1915).
S }Hoen v. District Court, 412 P.2d 428, 431 (Colo. 1966) ; Hallett v. Alexander, 50
Colo. 37, 50, 114 Pac. 490, 495 (1911) ; Houlahan v. Finance Consol. Min. Co., 34
Colo. 365, 368, 82 Pac. 484, 485 (1905); Bradbury v. Davis, 5 Colo. 265, 269
(1882).
37 COLO. SENATE LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL 1078, S. Bill No. 251 (1955). It is interesting to note that the late Senator Wilkie Ham, a co-sponsor of the statute, was formerly an Assistant U.S. Attorney in Illinois for six years. Senator Ham also taught
criminal law and evidence for six years at Marshall Law School in Chicago. It is hard
to resist the conclusion that Senator Ham was aware of the Illinois interpretative case
law existing at the time he sponsored the statute. Colorado Legislative Directory at
28 (1963).
-"Brief for Appellant, p. 34, Boyer v. Elkins, 154 Colo. 294, 390 P.2d 460 (1964).
3

39

Ibid.

1966

ARREST WITHOUT A WARRANT

the defendants were within their rights in resisting the officers.
Furthermore, the defendants vigorously stressed that reasonable
grounds for believing an offense had been committed was not
enough to justify an arrest. 0 Authority for this contention was
based on the construction problem raised by the statute. The defendants argued:
C.R.S. 39-2-20 . . . apparently was copied from the Illinois
law . . . . The construction placed on this statute by the Illinois
courts prior to the enactment of the same statute in Colorado in
1955 is entitled to great weight and is at least strongly persuasive
upon the courts of this state for the reason that the presumption is
that the law was enacted in the light of the construction given it by
41
the courts of the state from which the statute was taken.

The defendants then set forth the Illinois interpretation:
The Illinois courts before and since 1955 have construed their
statute to mean that unless a criminal offense has actually been

committed or attempted, the arrest is unlawful no matter if the officers acted under reasonable belief and in good faith. The language
of both the Colorado and Illinois statutes is specified, 'when a
criminal offense has, in fact been committed .... ,42 (Emphasis

added.)
The defendants cited numerous cases proving the Illinois interpretation. 3
Counsel for the arresting officers, interestingly enough, made
no attempt to dispute defendants' use of the Illinois case law as
authority for interpreting the Colorado statute.44 However, the
officers' counsel cited, in addition to Colorado Revised Statutes,
section 39-2-20 (1963), section 211.1 of the Revised Municipal
Code of the City and County of Denver which is directly contrary
to the statute in that it allows an officer to "arrest any person found
under circumstances which would warrant a reasonable man in believing that such person had committed or is about to commit a
crime."'" The plaintiffs, for good reason, never directly argued that
4'Id.at 43.
41 Id. at 35.
42d.

at 36.
37. The defendants stated:

'3Id. at

In a recent case, McKendree v. Christy... in applying the rule set forth
in early cases, the court stated . . . 'These cases interpreting this section [Sec.

657] are clear in holding that where an officer makes an arrest without a
warrant for an alleged crime which has not been committed in his presence,
such arrest is illegal if the crime has not actually been committed . . . in such
case the absence of malice or the presence of probable cause constitutes no defense. 19 J.L.P. False Imprisonment, Pay. 5; Levin v. Costello, 214 Ill. App.
505; Wood v. Olson, 117 I11.
App. 128; Markey v. Griffin, 109 Ill. App. 212.'
44Brief for Appellee, p. 33, Boyer v. Elkins, 154 Colo. 294, 390 P.2d 460 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellee].
451d. at 34.
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the municipal ordinance should prevail over the state statute, but
the implication is clearly there."6
The mention of the city ordinance was somewhat surprising,
since the landmark case of Canon City v. Merris47 established that in
an area of statewide as well as local concern, the state statute prevails over a corresponding municipal ordinance even though the
offense was committed within the municipality. Merris held that
drunken driving was a matter of statewide concern; certainly the
right to arrest without a warrant is on an equal par.
After this nuance, the officers' counsel turned to a definition
of "reasonable cause," the second necessary element in an arrest
without a warrant. As the statute plainly states, not only must the
offense have in fact been committed, but the officer must also have
reasonable grounds for believing that the person arrested is the guilty
party. Due to the lack of Colorado cases in this area, the plaintiffs
were forced to rely on out-of-state cases. 8 It should be noted that
the word "reasonable" is subject to varying definitions. 9
The plaintiffs also raised the definitional specter of another
important word -

"presence."

This definition can vary

-

from

what an officer actually sees, to knowledge afforded him by any of
his senses.5"
Finally, the plaintiffs said, in effect, that if any doubts remain,
the officers were justified in making the arrests because the defendants committed actual offenses after the arrival of the officers and
in their presence." Thus, the plaintiffs afforded the court an opportunity to avoid determining whether the statute only validates an
arrest when an out-of-presence offense has in fact been committed
- all the court had to say was that, in this case, offenses were in
fact committed.
The Colorado Supreme Court, instead of availing itself of the
opportunity to interpret the statute and thus clarify the officers'
right to arrest without a warrant, chose - perhaps with good
reason - to avoid the major issues.
While quoting both the contradictory laws, the court did not
indicate whether it relied upon the Colorado statute or upon the
Denver Municipal Code. 2 As previously mentioned, Denver, unlike Colorado, allows the arrest solely on the ground of probable
4Ibid.
41 137 Colo. 169, 182, 323 P.2d 614, 621 (1958).
48

Brief for Appellee, p. 38.

49 36 WORDS AND PHRASES 448 (1962).
6

0LA FARE, ARREST 236 (1965).
51 Brief for Appellee, p. 72.
52 154 Colo. at 300, 390 P.2d at 463.
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cause regardless of whether an offense has in fact been committed.
The court also refrained from defining either probable cause or
presence. In addition, the court failed to mention whether or not
Illinois case law is governing in interpreting this statute. As previously shown, the question is of extreme importance in the area
of citizen's as well as police arrest without a warrant.
Ultimately, the court, by holding that an offense was in fact
committed, was able to avoid deciding whether probable cause as
to the crime's commission would have been sufficient to justify the
arrest.
The only progress made by Boyer was in solidifying the previously known rules that a criminal offense committed outside the
presence of an officer includes a misdemeanor or violation of a city
ordinance as well as a felony and, as to the person, the officer need
only have reasonable grounds for believing that the person arrested
was the guilty party. 3
It is interesting to speculate concerning the reasons for the
court's reluctance to decide the major problems. It is submitted
that the evidence was so strongly weighted toward adopting the
Illinois interpretation, and thus the "in fact" requirement, that it
would have been very difficult for the court to have adopted any
other interpretation. Realizing this, and not wishing to so drastically burden the arresting officer, the court may have decided to
ignore the problem in the hope that realistic legislative change
would be forthcoming, as recently happened when the same statute
was repealed in Illinois."4 It seems fair to conclude that the criticisms leveled at the Colorado statute5 are not eliminated by Boyer.
In 1964, the hoped-for change was partially realized by a statute
applicable only to county courts :5"

A summons and complaint may be issued by any peace officer
for an offense constituting a misdemeanor which was committed in
his presence or, if not committed in his presence, concerning which
he has reasonable grounds for believing was committed in fact and

was committed by the person charged."

(Emphasis added.)

53 Id. at 301, 390 P.2d at 462.
4 Smith-Hurd ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 107-2 (c) (1964): "A peace officer may arrest a person when: He has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is committing or has committed an offense." The Committee Comments following this revision
are illuminating: "[Slubsection (c) adopts the federal rule, and that of many other
jurisdictions, that an arrest without a warrant may be made on reasonable grounds
that the person has committed or is committing an offense, and not on the basis that
'an offense has in fact been committed,' which is almost impossible for an officer to
determine ...
"
s Weinstein, Local Responsibility for Improvement of Search and Seizure Practices, 34
RocKy MT. L. REV. 150, 157 (1962).
56
57

Colo. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 45, § 55, at 429.
Colo. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 45, § 59, at 430.
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Realizing that a summons per se is not considered an arrest,"
the officer is placed in the anomolous position of being absolved
from liability if he is reasonably wrong regarding the commission
of the misdemeanor if he merely issues a summons, but is liable for
this reasonable mistake if he arrests for the same offense. There is
also a distinct possibility that stopping and detaining a person for
the purpose of writing and issuing a summons constitutes an arrest.
The 1965 case of Gonzales v. People,5" is helpful in defining
probable cause. The court, after determining that probable cause
and reasonable grounds are substantially equivalent in meaning, set
forth a realistic and workable definition when it said: "Indealing
with probable cause, one deals with probabilities. 'These are not
technical; they are factual and practical considerations of everyday
life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,
act.' "60
However, the "reasonable cause" language relating to the commission of the crime creates a pitfall for the unwary in both the
language in the case"' and the headnotes on arrest. 2 Taken together, they seem to indicate that an officer is justified in making
an arrest when he has reasonable grounds for believing that a crime
has been committed (assuming he also has reasonable grounds for
believing that the person arrested was the guilty party). A close
analysis of Gonzales and three subsequent cases63 indicates that
probable cause, as to both the crime and the person arrested, is only
considered after it has been established that a crime was in fact
committed.
The Gonzales case involved an arrest without a warrant followed by a search for and seizure of narcotics on the person of the
defendant. In appealing the conviction, defense counsel argued
that the officers did not have probable cause for believing that a
crime had been committed and therefore the arrest and the ensuing
search and seizure were illegal.84 The officers' reasonable grounds
for believing that the defendant was the guilty party and the fact
that the crime was actually committed were not disputed.
58 Colo. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 45, § 67, at 432; Hart v. Herzig, 131 Colo. 458, 464, 283
P.2d 177, 180 (1955).
59
398 P.2d 236 (Colo. 1965).
60 Id. at 239.
81 Id. at 238. "Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the officers' knowledge . . . are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or isbeing committed."
2

6 1d. at 236.

6 Lavato v. People, 411 P.2d 328 (Colo. 1966) ; Gallegos v. People, 401 P.2d 613
(Colo. 1965); Wilson v. People, 398 P.2d 35 (Colo. 1965).
64 398 P.2d at 238.
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The supreme court held that the arrest was valid because the
officers had reasonable grounds for believing that a crime had been
committed.' By implication, however, the court was actually holding that probable cause as to the commission of the crime is only
considered after it has been established that a crime was in fact committed. In other words, the in fact commission is still a condition
precedent to lawful arrest without a warrant.
Wilson v. People," decided on the same day, illustrates this
principle. In this case, although the actual commission of the crime
was established, the court held that the arrest was illegal because
the officers did not have reasonable grounds for believing that a
crime had been committed.
Later cases of Gallegos v. People" and Lavato v. People"
had essentially the same fact patterns and demonstrated the same
principle. In both cases a crime had actually been committed and
the court was primarily concerned with determining whether the
officers had probable cause for believing that a crime had been
committed.
The thread running through all four of the preceding cases is
apparent: The actual commission of a crime had been established
and the court was only concerned with analyzing the additional requirements necessary for a valid arrest without a warrant.
III.

PRESENT STATE OF THE LAw

Summarizing the present state of Colorado law relating to an
officer's right to arrest without a warrant, we find that:
1. An officer's common law right to arrest only for a felony
or breach of peace committed in his presence or a felony
committed out of his presence has definitely been extended
to all other types of offenses - misdemeanors, breaches of
the peace and violations of city ordinances - whether they
were committed in or out of his presence. This is a major
advance as the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors is often technical and artificial." Today the officer is
no longer handicapped by having to categorize a crime
before deciding whether or not he has the right to make
an arrest.
2. Regardless of the type of offense, the officer need only
65

Id.at 239.
"398 P.2d 35 (Colo. 1965).
67401 P.2d 613 (Colo. 1965).
68411 P.2d 328 (Colo. 1966).
69

PROSSER, TORTS § 26, at 134 (3d ed. 1964).
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have reasonable grounds for believing the person arrested
committed either the "in" or "out-of-presence" offense.
3. As to the offense itself, it is not absolutely clear whether
reasonable cause precludes liability for arresting for an
out-of-presence offense or if it must in fact have been
committed. A literal reading of the statute, the adoption
of the Illinois wording, plus the supreme court's reluctance
to come to grips with the problem indicate the latter. If
this is true, the officer's common law right to arrest for a
felony based on mere reasonable cause has been drastically
restricted. This restriction would be a major and unfortunate abrogation of common law rights and will needlessly
handicap an officer; he would probably be overly hesitant
in arresting for an offense committed out of his presence.
4. Also, if an offense must in fact have been committed to
validate an out-of-presence arrest without a warrant, the
wording of the statute indicates that this same standard
extends to in-presence offenses as well. Again, with respect
to a felony, this would be a drastic and unnecessary curtailment of an officer's common law right. However, the possibility of a variable standard should not be overlooked.
Reasonable cause as to the commission of an in-presence
offense might validate the arrest while for an out-ofpresence offense in fact commission would be necessary.
From the preceding, it is obvious that clarification is necessary.
Realizing that realistic change must enable the police officer to
effectively fulfill his duties, and at the same time afford protection
to the individual, one major change should be made: The requirement of an "in fact" commission of an offense should be abolished
and the officer should have the right to arrest when he has reasonable cause for believing that any type of offense has been committed.
This standard should apply whether or not the crime was committed
in or out of the officer's presence.
The present state of confusion must be rectified as soon as
possible. Since the courts seem demonstrably loathe to clarify the
situation, legislative action is imperative.
Chet Walter

